India's nuclear doctrine, built around the principles of credible minimum deterrence and a no-first-use commitment, has provided strategic stability for over two decades. However, the evolving nuclear postures of both China and Pakistan — including Pakistan's development of tactical nuclear weapons and China's dramatic expansion of its nuclear arsenal — are generating substantive debate about whether India's deterrent posture remains adequate. The Bharat Defence Tech Show has hosted some of India's most distinguished strategic affairs scholars in addressing this sensitive but critical question.
India's nuclear triad — land-based ICBMs, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and airborne delivery systems — is progressively reaching maturity. The INS Arihant class SSBNs give India an assured second-strike capability that is invulnerable to a disarming first strike, a capability that fundamentally enhances the credibility of India's nuclear deterrent. BDTS strategic dialogues have examined the operational requirements of maintaining nuclear-armed submarines on continuous deterrent patrol while managing the enormous technical and human demands this places on the Indian Navy.
The relationship between conventional and nuclear deterrence has been a recurring BDTS theme, particularly in the context of India's developing conventional precision strike capabilities. The question of whether advanced conventional strikes could be misinterpreted as nuclear attacks — potentially triggering an unintended nuclear response — is a serious strategic stability concern that has been addressed with rigorous academic rigor at BDTS strategic sessions.
Export control and non-proliferation considerations in India's strategic context have also featured at BDTS, with discussions on India's adherence to MTCR, Wassenaar Arrangement, and NSG guidelines and the implications for India's access to advanced strategic technologies.
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